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Over the past few years, the Italian Constitutional Court has largely contributed to
the equalization of the positions of parents as far as the choice of the surname(s) for
newborns is concerned. In the absence of legislative reforms, it has tried to adapt
the Italian legal framework, which still adheres to traditional naming practices, to
constitutional and international standards of equality, with inputs coming from the
ECtHR as well.
In the recent decision (ordinanza) n. 18/2021, responding to a question of
constitutionality submitted by the Tribunal of Bolzano on the possibility for the
parents to agree on the mother’s surname for their child, the Court went further. The
justices submitted, to their own judgment, the more general question of whether
the automatic preference of the father’s surname, enshrined in the Civil Code, is
compatible with the Constitution. In this case, the Court considered that simply
permitting the consensual choice of the mother’s surname may not be appropriate
and sufficient to ensure equality between parents, as the default option would still be
the automatic attribution of the father’s surname.
This step shows the intention to counter the Parliament’s inertia, after it has enjoyed
a fairly long timespan to exercise the power to regulate a certain issue after domestic
and international judgments on the matter. It is not as explicit as it was in a recent
case, in which the Court gave the legislature almost a year to decide and afterwards
intervened, but it is a symptom of the same logic.
The Court takes the initiative to raise a question in extremely rare cases (the last
one was in 2014: decision n. 114 and judgment n. 255). The conditions to be met
are multiple, because the norm challenged by the Court has to represent a logical,
instrumental premise with respect to the issue at stake (see e.g. judgments n.
122/1976 and n. 304/1986), requiring a preliminary ruling (see e.g. decisions n.
294/1993 and n. 225/1995).
Even if the conclusion of this case may seem obvious as the question was raised
by the constitutional justices themselves, this is not entirely true. The outcome of
the judgment of the Court on the self-submitted question could change, vis-à-vis
amended legislation (as it happened in decision n. 366/1996), or due to a variation
in the composition of the Court. Although none of these options seem likely at the
moment, certainty will only come with the final judgment, which will most probably
reflect the dynamic explained above, leading to a compensation of legislative inertia.
- 1 -
The Increasing Protection Provided by the Court
Against Discriminatory Family Law
Before the past decade, the justices of the Constitutional Court were more inclined
to demand the intervention of the legislator with respect to this issue. In fact,
already in 1988 (decisions n. 186 and n. 586), the Court had dismissed similar
claims acknowledging that society may evolve towards different naming criteria,
more consistent with the autonomy of the parents, but devolving such change to a
legislative measure. In 2006 (judgment n. 61/2006), in another concrete or incidental
proceeding (in which a judge challenged norms to be applied in an actual case
pending before him), the Court took a small step forward. It recalled international
sources and the case law of the ECtHR, as it stated that the mechanism of automatic
attribution of the father’s surname derives from a patriarchal understanding of
families which infringes upon current constitutional norms, especially with respect
to equality between sexes. Nevertheless, it did not admit this case, considering
that the creative operation asked to the Court would exceed its role, while urging
the Parliament to intervene (similarly to the domestic judgment, n. 138/2010, which
preceded ECtHR’s Oliari and others v. Italy).
Later on, the question of the choice of the surname was submitted to the ECtHR in
the case Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy (2014). Here, the applicants tried unsuccessfully
to register their daughter under the mother’s surname, receiving first a denial and,
after the corresponding appeal, the authorization to add the mother’s surname to
the father’s. The couple challenged these decisions alleging that their right to private
and family life had been violated, alongside the prohibition of discrimination and the
right to equality between spouses. Focusing on gender discrimination and observing
that the “patriarchal” conception of families based on the role of the husband is not
compatible with the principle of equality between men and women (para. 67), the
ECtHR concluded that there had been a discrimination, as well as a violation of the
right to private and family life. In spite of the explicit call upon Italian authorities to
amend legislation and praxis in this respect (para. 81), no reform has succeeded in
Parliament.
Two years later, in judgment n. 286/2016, the Constitutional Court ruled that spouses
are allowed to consensually add the surname of the mother to the one of the father
at the birth of the child, extending this option to unmarried couples and adoptions.
Interestingly, the reasoning of the Court in that case was based exclusively on
the Italian constitutional framework, namely articles 2, 3 and 29 (for an analysis of
the arguments see here). The traditional mechanism would negatively affect the
right to personal identity of the child, while representing an unreasonable unequal
treatment of the spouses, which does not serve the purpose of protecting the unity
of the family as enshrined in article 29 of the Constitution and violates the “moral and
legal equality between spouses” (for a critical comment see here). The international
framework, and in particular the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR, which
could have been included in the judgment thanks to the reference to article 117
of the Constitution (according to which the legislative powers of the State and the
Regions have to be exercised in compliance with the Constitution and within the
- 2 -
constraints deriving from EU legislation and international obligations), was not taken
into account in this case. The Court relied upon domestic standards, missing the
opportunity to enter into a dialogue with the previous European case law on the
matter (see here).
2021: Requiring the Parents’ Agreement is Not
Enough
In October 2019, the Tribunal of Bolzano raised a question concerning the
constitutionality of article 262.1 of the Civil Code, which provides for the children
born from unmarried couples that, when both parents recognize them, they are
automatically assigned the father’s surname. This is valid even against the common
will of the parents to give them exclusively the mother’s surname, which was the
actual case before the Tribunal.
The claim considers that this mechanism violates article 2 of the Constitution,
with respect to the protection of personal identity, as well as article 3 (principle of
equality), being founded on sex discrimination and a traditional, outdated conception
of the family and the role of the husband, already contested in judgment n. 286/2016.
Additionally, it relies upon article 117 of the Constitution to recall articles 8 and 14 of
the ECHR, the ECtHR’s judgment Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, and articles 7 and 21 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
In decision n. 18/2021, against the opinion of the State’s defense representing
the executive in the case, the Court preliminarily ruled that the petitum of the
Tribunal did not require a creative operation, but the potential recognition of a
“constitutionally imposed” exception to the rule. It affirmed as well that the issue at
stake was intertwined with the regulation of the automatic attribution of the father’s
surname, which represents the result of a legal tradition no longer consistent with the
constitutional framework.
In judgment n. 286/2016, the Court had stated the need to restore the principle of
equality between parents as an obligation for the Parliament, which has not reacted
yet. Therefore, “pending a legislative intervention, which cannot be postponed,
intended to organically regulate the matter, according to criteria finally coherent with
the principle of equality”, the general norm would stay in place.
Therefore, the question assumes a wider scope than the one submitted by the
Tribunal of Bolzano. Even if the possibility to choose the maternal surname was
granted to the parents, the general rule of assigning the father’s surname would be
applied without their specific contrary agreement. Such cases would presumably
be very frequent and would confirm the prevalence of the paternal surname,
incompatible with the value of equality largely affirmed in previous jurisprudence: just
the mother would need to reach such an agreement to give her surname to the child,
the mechanism being automatic for the father.
The decision on whether this automatism is unconstitutional logically precedes
the solution of the question raised by the Tribunal of Bolzano, as it may challenge
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the principle of equality of the parents, the right to personal identity of the child,
and not guarantee the unity of the family (which would be pursued more clearly
through egalitarian norms, as such unity requires solidarity and parity, defended
already in judgment n. 133/1079). Additionally, the ECHR enters into the equation
through article 117 of the Constitution, in reference to articles 8 and 14 and their
interpretation provided in the abovementioned case Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy.
Consequently, the Court felt obliged to raise before itself the question of
constitutionality of article 262.1 of the Civil Code as far as it still establishes the
automatic attribution of the father’s surname. Requiring an agreement between the
parents to choose the mother’s surname would still be a violation of equality, as
the father would not need any action to see his surname attributed to the newborn.
The phrasing of the question and the recent judicial trends make it likely that the
judgment of the Court will strike down the automatic mechanism. Nevertheless,
only the Court’s final decision on this self-submitted question will determine the
elimination of the automatism from the legal system, thanks again to constitutional
case law compensating for the lack of legislative interventions.
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